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Career Helitack Fire Fighter Dies in Burnover During an Initial Attack 
at a Wildland Fire Operation - CA
January 13, 2006A summary of a NIOSH fire fighter fatality investigation
On September 12, 2004, a 24-year-old female 
career fire fighter (the victim) died while 
conducting an initial attack at a wildland fire. 
A Helitack crew responded in a helicopter to 
a wildland fire in a remote river drainage with 
slopes ranging from 80 to 120 percent.  The crew 
began constructing an indirect downhill handline 
from a forest service road in an attempt to 
establish an anchor point at the river.  A wind shift 
caused the fire to make an upslope run into the 
crew.  Four crew members ran downhill toward 
the river while the victim and another fire fighter 
ran uphill toward another crew member standing 
on the road.  The victim was overrun by fire and 
later pronounced dead at the scene.
NIOSH investigators concluded that, to minimize 
the risk of similar occurrences, fire departments 
and fire service agencies should
•	 ensure	that	crews	are	able	to	reach	a	safety	
zone(s)	quickly	when	deciding	to	construct	
a	 downhill/indirect	 handline	 in	 steep	
terrain.
 The Fire Fighter Fatality Investigation and Prevention 
Program is conducted by the National Institute for 
Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH). The purpose of 
the program is to determine factors that cause or contribute to 
fire fighter deaths suffered in the line of duty. Identification of 
causal and contributing factors enable researchers and safety 
specialists to develop strategies for preventing future similar 
incidents. The program does not seek to determine fault or 
place blame on fire departments or individual fire fighters.  
To request additional copies of this report (specify the case 
number shown in the shield above), other fatality investigation 
reports, or further information, visit the Program Website at
www.cdc.gov/niosh/firehome.html
or call toll free 1-800-35-NIOSH
SUMMARY
•	 ensure	that	officers	establish	an	initial	attack	
plan	 that	 allows	 for	 the	fire	 to	 be	 fought	
aggressively,	but	provides	for	the	protection	
and	safety	of	fire	fighters	first.
•	 ensure	 that	crews	 fully	comply	with	“The	
Standard	Fire	Orders”.





On September 12, 2004, a 24-year-old female 
career fire fighter (the victim) died while 
conducting an initial attack at a wildland fire.  On 
September 14, 2004, the U.S. Fire Administration 
notified the National Institute for Occupational 
Safety and Health (NIOSH) of this incident.  On 
November 16-17, 2004, a  Safety and Occupational 
Health Specialist and the Senior Investigator from 
the NIOSH Fire Fighter Fatality Investigation and 
Prevention Program investigated this incident. 
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representatives that included a conference call 
with two additional state agency representatives 
and a U.S. Forest Service (USFS) representative 
also investigating this incident.  Interviews were 
conducted with the helicopter flight officers 
and a fire fighter involved in this incident.  On 
December 8, 2004, a phone interview was 
conducted with an additional fire fighter from 
the Helitack crew involved in this incident. 
The NIOSHinvestigators reviewed the training 
records for the victim and the crew members 
and the victim’s autopsy report and death 
certificate.  NIOSH investigators also reviewed 
the department’s fireground standard operating 
procedures (SOPs) and the state agency’s 
incident report.  The state agency unit involved 
in this incident is comprised of 138 permanent 
uniformed fire fighters and 140 seasonal fire 
fighters serving a population of approximately 
103,500 in a geographical area of about 4,400 
square miles.
A glossary of terms used in this report is included 
as an appendix to this report.
Training and Experience
The victim was a fire fighter who had approximately 
4 fire seasons of wildland fire fighting experience 
with an engine crew and 6 months of experience 
with this Helitack crew.  The victim had the 
following training/qualifications with the state 
agency: Fire Fighter I Basic, Advanced Fire 
Fighter I and Basic Helitack.  The victim also had 
National Wildfire Coordinating Group (NWCG) 
S-212 Wildfire Power Saw training.
Helitack Crew Experience
Note: The Helitack crew members were employed 
by the state agency at the time of the incident. 
Some of the members have prior experience 
working with the USFS.
Helitack Pilot – Full time pilot with the state 
agency for 5 years and a Lieutenant for 10 fire 
seasons.
Helitack Captain #1 – Helitack Captain for 11 
years, Engineer for 6 years and Hotshot Captain 
with the USFS for 10 years.
Helitack Captain #2 – Helitack Captain for 
8 weeks, Captain for 2 years, Engineer and 
Paramedic for 2 years, and Fire Fighter for 5 
years.
Fire Fighter #1 – Helitack for 2 fire seasons, 
Engine Company for 1 fire season, USFS Hotshot 
crew for 2 fire seasons and a USFS Hand crew 
for 1 fire season.
Fire Fighter #2 – Helitack for 1 fire season and 
Engine Company for 3 fire seasons.
Fire Fighter #3 – Helitack for 5 months, Engine 
Company for 3 fire seasons and Tanker Base for 
1 fire season. 
Fire Fighter #4 – Helitack for 6 fire seasons and 
Engine Company for 4 fire seasons.
Fire Fighter #5 – Helitack for 2 fire seasons and 
Engine Company for 4 fire seasons.
Equipment and Personnel
The fire was reported at approximately 1233 hours 
with a dispatch and response at approximately 
1245 hours consisting of 2 chief officers (one 
from the USFS and one from the state agency), 
6 engines, 1 water tender, Air Attack 440 (twin-
engine fixed-wing aircraft with a pilot and Air 
Tactical Group Supervisor), Air Tankers 82 and 
83 (Type III [S-2]) and Copter 404.
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Copter 404 (Type II) – Helitack Pilot, Helitack 
Captain #1, Helitack Captain #2, Fire Fighter 
#1, Fire Fighter #2, victim, Fire Fighter #3, Fire 
Fighter #4 and Fire Fighter #5.
The fire was under the Command of the USFS.
Fire
The fire was approximately 5-10 acres in size at 
the time Copter 404 flew over the incident scene 
as part of the crew’s size-up of the fire and terrain. 
Nothing of concern was noted by the crew upon 
initial size-up.  The fire spread in light, flashy 
surface fuels at the time of the initial attack with 
a majority of the fire above the forest service road 
heading toward the ridgeline (Photo 1).  Smoke 
was blowing lightly up canyon and obscured the 
left flank of the fire.  No spot fires were observed 
at this time.
Fuels
The fuels were predominately oak, mixed brush, 
leaf litter, and light grass with an oak overstory 
consistent with Fuel Model 2.  The surface fuel 
layer consisted of oak leaf and pine needle litter 
and sparse, short, discontinuous cured annual 
grasses less than 12 inches in height.  
One-hour fine fuel moisture was estimated to be 
4-5%.1 Live fuel moisture values at the incident 
site were estimated to be 61% and 71% for 
Chamise and Manzanita respectively.  Note: Fuel 
moisture levels of 60% for Chamise and 80% for 
Manzanita are often designated as the “critical” 
fuel moistures for these fuels.
Weather
The temperature ranged from 89-94 degrees 
Fahrenheit with a relative humidity (RH) of 18-
24%.  The wind was predominantly steady and 
up-canyon (out of the west-southwest), estimated 
to be 3-5 miles per hour.
Ground and air crews reported that the wind 
remained light and was flowing steadily in an 
up-canyon direction with no critical fire weather 
patterns (thunderstorms, frontal passages, etc.) 
prior to or during the fatal event.
Topography
The incident site was located in a major river 
drainage in the Sierra Nevada range at an 
elevation of 1,450 feet.  The topography in the 
river canyon is best characterized as having steep, 
rugged, broken terrain with numerous tributary 
canyons and ridges with slopes ranging from 80-
120 percent.  The incident site was located on a 
west facing slope of 90 percent at the bottom of 
the river canyon.
INVESTIGATION
A fire was spotted by a lookout and reported to 
Central Dispatch at approximately 1233 hours. 
Central Dispatch initiated a wildland fire response 
with equipment and crews responding from five 
different fire stations and one Air Attack Base.
At approximately 1245 hours, a Helitack crew of 
nine personnel responded in Copter 404.  Helitack 
Captain #2 along with the victim and five other 
fire fighters were dropped off on a river bar where 
they unloaded a chainsaw with saw pack, five 
hand tools and five backpack pumps.  The crew 
then attached a 324 gallon water bucket to the 
bottom of Copter 404.  The Helitack pilot and 
Helitack Captain #1 flew Copter 404 up river and 
began making bucket drops near the forest service 
road on the right flank of the fire while two air 
tankers continued retardant drops above the forest 
service road on the right flank of the fire.
At approximately 1320 hours, the Chief Officer 
from the USFS (Incident Commander [IC]) 
arrived on the scene and drove past the Helitack 
crew who were now making their way up the 
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road toward the right flank of the fire to conduct 
his size-up.  Note: The forest service road was 
located on a steep hillside with an average slope 
of 90 percent.  He arrived at the right flank of 
the fire and observed fire burning above and 
below the road.  He continued along the road a 
short distance then decided to turn around.  At 
approximately 1325 hours, the IC met up with the 
Helitack crew who were now half way between 
the landing zone and the incident site.   The IC 
talked face-to-face with Helitack Captain #2 
and provided the captain with his assessment 
of the fire and the topography.  Captain #2 was 
instructed by the IC to “size things up to see if 
there was some place they could anchor the fire 
to the river.”  Note: Captain #2 later stated that 
he understood his instructions to be to “anchor 
the fire on the right flank, from the road down 
to the river.”  The IC proceeded down the road 
to a campground where he could better observe 
the fire.
Copter 404 made six bucket drops on the right 
flank of the fire prior to the Helitack crew 
reaching the incident site at approximately 1335 
hours.  Note: These drops were made above 
the road.  Fire Fighter #1 and Fire Fighter #2 
continued east on the forest service road to verify 
their position in relation to a bridge further up 
river and to find an access point to the river from 
the road.  They did not find an access point to 
the river.  The two fire fighters returned and met 
up with the crew at the incident site.  Captain #2 
then hiked down the hill as part of his size-up 
and returned to inform the crew that the distance 
to the river was approximately 300 feet.  He 
identified the safety zones as the forest service 
road and the river.  Captain #2 then decided that 
an indirect attack would help to keep the crew out 
of the heat, smoke, and heavy brush and would 
allow his crew to leave the backpack pumps on 
the road.  The crew was briefed by Captain #2 on 
the situation and asked if there were any concerns 
about their assignment.  No concerns were voiced 
by the crew.  Captain #2 directed the fire fighters 
to leave the backpack pumps (full of water) 
on the forest service road.  Captain #2 radioed 
Captain #1 in Copter 404 and advised him that 
the Helitack crew would be building a downhill 
handline on the right flank of the fire.  Note: The 
IC did not hear this radio transmission as it is 
believed that the IC was on the command channel 
at this time ordering additional resources.  
At approximately 1340 hours, Engine 43 (E-43) 
arrived at the campground and met with the IC. 
The IC informed the E-43 Captain that there was 
a Helitack crew working the right flank of the fire 
and instructed the Captain to support them.
The Helitack crew began constructing the indirect 
handline, beginning at the forest service road 
(approximately 260 feet above the river), in an 
attempt to establish an anchor point at the river 
(Diagram and Photo 1).  The crew’s handline 
was approximately 6 to 30 feet from the fire’s 
edge, downhill in an oak overstory with brush 
fuels (Photo 2).  The fire was backing into an up-
canyon wind with flame lengths of approximately 
6 to 12-inches.  The sawyer (Fire Fighter #4) 
and his swamper (Fire Fighter #5) were the first 
down the hill clearing brush while the rest of the 
crew followed them, constructing the handline 
(Diagram).
At approximately 1342 hours, the E-43 Captain 
had the driver spot the apparatus along the road 
just to the west of the Helitack crew.  The E-43 
Captain and a fire fighter proceeded on foot 
toward the incident site.
Captain #2 directed Fire Fighter #2 to burn-out 
the fuel between the fire’s edge and the handline. 
Using a fusee, Fire Fighter #2 began putting 
fire on the ground where the handline met the 
road.  He worked his way down the handline, 
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approximately 25 feet, where he met up with 
the victim.
At approximately 1345 hours, the Helitack 
crew continued working the handline and was 
unaware of an increase in fire activity above the 
road.  Captain #2 directed Fire Fighter #1, Fire 
Fighter #2 and the victim to utilize a backpack 
pump to prevent any slopover along the handline. 
Fire Fighter #1 hiked up the handline to the road 
to retrieve a backpack pump.  Fire Fighter #1 
encountered the E-43 Captain on the road and 
discussed the handline construction.  The E-43 
Captain told the E-43 fire fighter that they would 
not commit the E-43 crew to the handline due to 
the steep terrain (90 percent slope).      
At approximately 1346 hours, the wind shifted, 
causing the fire to make an upslope run into the 
crew.  Fire Fighter #2 saw the flare-up below 
him and yelled “wind change.”  Captain #2 saw 
the flare-up above him and yelled “emergency 
action.”  Captain #2, Fire Fighter #3, Fire Fighter 
#4 and Fire Fighter #5 ran downhill while the 
victim, following directly behind Fire Fighter 
#2, ran uphill toward the road.  The victim was 
approximately five feet from the edge of the road 
when she was overrun by the fire (Diagram). 
Fire Fighter #2 narrowly escaped the fire as he 
reached the road.
Captain #2 radioed Copter 404 and reported 
that Helitack 404 had been burned over with 
crew members sustaining injuries.  Captain #2 
requested immediate assistance with bucket 
drops.  The flare-up was over within 30 seconds 
and reverted to a backing fire.
Fire Fighter #2 radioed Captain #2 and reported 
that the victim was missing.  An immediate search 
began below the road near the handline.  Smoke 
in the area limited visibility as the crew members 
yelled the victim’s name.  At approximately 1354 
hours, Fire Fighter #1 and Fire Fighter #2 located 
the victim’s body that had come to final rest 
approximately 90 feet below the forest service 
road (Diagram and Photo 3).  Initial assessment 
by the crew members determined that the victim 
was deceased.
A number of factors contributed to the fatal event. 
The factors include, but are not limited to, the 
steep terrain (difficulty in reaching safety zones 
up a 90% slope in a timely manner), the sudden 
change in wind direction, the unburned fuel 
between the handline and the fire, and available 
resources (Copter 404 and Engine 43) in the area 
that were not utilized in support of establishing 
the handline and an anchor point at the river.
INJURIES
Helitack Captain – minor burns to the face.
Fire Fighter #2 – smoke inhalation.
Fire Fighter #3 – small second degree burn to left 
wrist and a small second degree burn to nose.
 
CAUSE OF DEATH
The autopsy report listed the cause of death as 
inhalation of products of combustion.
RECOMMENDATIONS/DISCUSSION
Recommendation	 #1:	 Fire	 departments	 and	
fire	service	agencies	should	ensure	that	crews	
are	 able	 to	 reach	 a	 safety	 zone(s)	 quickly	
when	deciding	to	construct	a	downhill/indirect	
handline	in	steep	terrain.
Discussion: Downhill handline construction is 
hazardous in steep terrain, fast-burning fuels, or 
rapidly changing weather.  Downhill handline 
construction should not be attempted unless there 
is no tactical alternative.  Direct attack methods 
should be used whenever possible.2,3,4   The 
NWCG Incident Response Pocket Guide provides 
an outline of minimum requirements when 
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and fireline overhead will discuss assignments 
prior to committing crew(s), a qualified overhead 
individual will stay with job until completed, the 
decision will be made after proposed handline has 
been scouted by supervisor(s) of involved crew(s), 
and lookouts, communications, escape routes and 
safety zones (LCES) will be coordinated for all 
personnel involved."4
The decision to construct a downhill/indirect 
handline should be made by a qualified supervisor 
after evaluating the situation.  The crew must be 
able to rapidly reach a safety zone from any point 
along the line if the fire unexpectedly crosses below 
them.2  Supervisors and fire fighters should look 
for and avoid the “WATCHOUT SITUATIONS” 
identified in the NWCG Fireline Handbook 
when deciding to construct a downhill/indirect 
handline.  Four of the eighteen “WATCHOUT 
SITUATIONS” that are applicable to this incident 
are: "(11) Unburned fuel between you and the 
fire, (13) On a hillside where rolling material 
can ignite fuel below, (15) Wind increases and/or 
changes direction, and (17) Terrain or fuels make 
escape to safety zones difficult."2
It is important for fire fighters to readily recognize 
the following common denominators from 
past fatal events so that future tragedies can be 
prevented:
• Most incidents happen on smaller fires or 
on isolated portions of larger fires.
• Most fires are innocent in appearance 
before unexpected shifts in wind direction 
and/or speed result in flare-ups or extreme 
fire behavior.  In some cases, tragedies 
occur in the mop-up stage.
• Flare-ups generally occur in deceptively 
light fuels, such as grass and light 
brush.
• Fires run uphill surprisingly fast in 
chimneys, saddles, gullies, and on steep 
slopes.
• Some suppression tools,  such as 
helicopters or airtankers, can adversely 
affect fire behavior.  The blasts of air from 
low-flying helicopters and airtankers have 
been known to cause flare-ups.5





Discussion: The NWCG Fireline Handbook’s 
chapter on initial attack states “upon arrival, 
officers should immediately determine an initial 
attack plan.  This should be done quickly and 
be based on the initial size-up of the fire.  The 
intent is to get work started in suppressing the 
fire as soon as possible.  The officer must first 
determine:
• The location of escape routes and safety 
zones.
• Good anchor points such as roads, burned 
area, rivers, etc.
• How to attack the fire (direct or 
indirect).
• Type of control line needed.
• When will the next units arrive?
• Additional resource needs.
• How will  topography affect  f ire 
behavior?”2
The NWCG Fireline Handbook includes an initial 
safety checklist that should be completed and 
reviewed as needed or as conditions change.  The 
safety checklist provides a list of questions that 
require a "yes" or "no" answer that the officer can 
utilize to ensure that all safety concerns have been 
addressed and mitigated.  Some of the questions 
in the checklist include: "Do you have a current 
weather forecast and is it consistent with observed 
fire weather?", "Are lookouts in place?", "Are the 
standard fire orders being followed?", and "Do 
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you have a complete list of what resources have 
been ordered for the fire?"  An answer of “no” 
to any of the questions on the checklist requires 
that the officer take corrective action immediately 




Discussion: A full list of "The Standard 
Fire Orders” can be found in Appendix II. 
The following “Standard Fire Orders” were 
compromised:
1. Fight fire aggressively but provide 
for safety first.  The initial attack was 
aggressive but did not provide for an 
adequate margin of safety.
2. Initiate all action based on current 
and expected fire behavior.  Actions 
were based on current fire behavior, 
low-intensity backing fire, without 
expectations of the fire making an upslope 
wind-driven run.
4. Ensure instructions are given and 
understood.  There appears to have been 
a miscommunication between Captain #2 
and the IC in that Captain #2 apparently 
misunderstood the IC’s instructions.
7. Determine safety zones and escape 
routes.  Safety zones and escape routes 
were identified but did not allow for 
adequate time for escape due to the steep 
terrain, loose soil conditions and distance 




crews	 establish	 Lookouts,	 Communications,	
Escape	Routes	and	Safety	Zones	(LCES)	prior	
to	fighting	the	fire.
Discussion: LCES is a safety procedure put in 
place before fighting the fire.  It is a self-triggering 
mechanism that functions sequentially: lookouts 
assess and reassess the fire environment; lookouts 
communicate safety threats to each fire fighter; 
and fire fighters use escape routes and move to 
safety zones.4, 5
Identification of escape routes and safety zones 
is one of the primary responsibilities of any 
wildland fire fighter working on or near the 
fireline.  The following guidelines can be used 
when selecting safety zones:
• Avoid locations that are downwind from 
the fire.
• Avoid locations that are in chimneys, 
saddles, or narrow canyons.
• Avoid locations that require a steep uphill 
escape route (greater than 50% slope).
• Take advantage of heat barriers such as 
lee side of ridges, large rocks, or solid 
structures.
• Burn out safety zones prior to flame front 
approach.4
The forest service road and the river were 
identified as the safety zones at this incident. 
These two sites were located uphill and downhill 
respectively on a hillside with a 90% slope.  The 
victim and Fire Fighter #2 attempted to run up 
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Additional safety resources for fire fighters 
who operate in the wildland/urban interface:
1. The Wildland Fire Lessons Learned Center 
web site: http://www.wildfirelessons.net/
2. The Federal Fire and Aviation Safety 
Team (FFAST) and the National Interagency 
Fire Center (NIFC) present the 	Minutes	for	
Safety at the following web site http://www.nifc.
gov/sixminutes/dsp_discussion.php?id=7.  This 
site provides a downhill fireline construction 
checklist. 
3. Wildland fire safety & health reporting 
network (SAFENET): This site provides  front 
line fire fighters a mechanism to report unsafe 
situations.  SAFENET submissions can be made 
and read at the following web site http://safenet.
nifc.gov/ 
INVESTIGATOR INFORMATION
This incident was investigated by Mark McFall, 
Safety and Occupational Health Specialist, 
and Richard Braddee, Senior Investigator, 
Surveillance and Field Investigations Branch, 
Division of Safety Research, NIOSH.  The report 
was written by Mark McFall.
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Appendix I - Glossary of Terms*
Anchor Point: An advantageous location, usually a barrier to fire spread, from which to start 
constructing a fireline.  The anchor point is used to minimize the chance of being flanked by the 
fire while the line is being constructed.
Backfire: Setting a fire in front of a wildfire to burn up fuel in the path of the advancing flame front 
and/or to change direction of the force of the fire’s convection column.
Backing Fire: Fire spreading, or ignited to spread, into (against) the wind or down slope.  A fire 
spreading on level ground in the absence of wind is a backing fire.
Backpack Pump: A portable sprayer with hand-pump, fed from a liquid filled container fitted with 
straps, used mainly in fire and pest control.
Burning Out: Setting fire inside a control line between the fire and the control line to remove 
unburned fuels.  Considered a normal part of line construction.  Reinforces the control line.
Fuel Moisture Content: The quantity of moisture in fuel expressed as a percentage of the weight 
when thoroughly dried at 212 degrees Fahrenheit.
Direct Attack: Building a fireline by wetting, smothering or physically separating the burning fuel 
from unburned fuel.  Usually done by hand crews, engines or tractors directly on the fire edge.
Fine Fuels: Fast-drying dead or live fuels, generally characterized by a comparatively high surface 
area-to-volume ratio, which are less than ¼-inch in diameter and have a timelag of one hour or 
less.  These fuels (grass, leaves, needles, etc.) ignite readily and are consumed rapidly by fire when 
dry.
Firing Out: Act of lighting fire with a torch, fusee, etc., to accomplish burning out or backfiring.
Flash Fuels: Highly combustible fine fuels such as grass, leaves, draped pine needles, fern, tree 
moss and some kinds of slash, which ignite readily and are consumed rapidly when dry.
Fuel Model: Simulated fuel complex for which all fuel descriptors required for the solution of a 
mathematical rate-of-spread model have been specified.
Fusee: A colored flare designed as a railway warning device, widely used to ignite backfires and 
other prescribed fires.
Green Sheet: An informational summary report issued by the state agency following a serious 
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the conditions and sequence of events leading to a serious accident. It is subject to revision as more 
findings are discovered. It is usually completed within 72 hours of the accident, and is therefore 
necessarily preliminary in nature and subject to potential inaccuracies.
Handline: Fireline constructed with hand tools.
Helitack: The utilization of helicopters to transport crews, equipment, and fire retardants or 
suppressants to the fireline during the initial stages of the fire.  The term also refers to the crew that 
performs helicopter management and attack activities.
Helitack Crew: A crew of fire fighters specially trained and certified in the tactical and logistical 
use of helicopters for fire suppression.
Indirect Attack:  A method of suppression in which the control line is located some considerable 
distance away from the fire’s active edge.  Generally done in the case of a fast-spreading or high-
intensity fire and to utilize natural or constructed firebreaks or fuelbreaks and favorable breaks in 
the topography.  The intervening fuel is usually backfired; but occasionally the main fire is allowed 
to burn to the line, depending on conditions.
Live Fuels: Living plants, such as trees, grasses, and shrubs, in which the seasonal moisture content 
cycle is controlled largely by internal physiological mechanisms, rather than by external weather 
influences.
Overhead: Personnel assigned to supervisory positions, including incident commander, com-
mand staff, general staff, branch directors, supervisors, unit leaders, managers and staff.
Resources: (1) Personnel, equipment, services and supplies available, or potentially available, for 
assignment to incidents. Personnel and equipment are described by kind and type, e.g., ground, 
water, air, etc., and may be used in tactical, support or overhead capacities at an incident. (2) The 
natural resources of an area, such as timber, grass, watershed values, recreation values, and wildlife 
habitat.
Slopover: A fire edge that crosses a control line or natural barrier intended to confine the fire.  Also 
called breakover.
Spot Fires: Fire ignited outside the perimeter of the main fire by a firebrand.
Spotting: Behavior of a fire producing sparks or embers that are carried by the wind and which 
start new fires beyond the zone of direct ignition by the main fire.
Swamper: A worker who assists fallers and/or sawyers by clearing away brush, limbs and small 
trees.  Carries fuels, oil and tools and watches for dangerous situations.
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Type: Refers to resource capability. A Type 1 resource provides a greater overall capability due 
to power, size, capacity, etc., than would be found in a Type 2 resource. Resource typing provides 
managers with additional information in selecting the best resource for the task.
*The majority of definitions were abstracted from “Glossary of Wildland Fire Terminology,” 
a publication of the National Wildfire Coordinating Group.  This glossary can be found in the 
National Wildfire Coordinating Group’s Fireline Handbook and at the following NWCG web 
site http://www.nwcg.gov/pms/pubs/glossary/index.htm
APPENDIX II - The Standard Fire Orders
Fight fire aggressively but provide for safety first.
Initiate all action based on current and expected fire behavior.
Recognize current weather conditions and obtain forecasts.
Ensure instructions are given and understood.
Obtain current information on fire status.
Remain in communication with crew members, your supervisor, and adjoining forces.
Determine safety zones and escape routes.
Establish lookouts in potentially hazardous situations.
Retain control at all times.
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Diagram. Aerial view of incident site at time of burnover
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Photo 2. View of handline from forest service road
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